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TRADE UNIONISM UNDER GLOBALIZATION: 
THE DEMISE OF VOLUNTARISM? 
SAMUEL ESTREICHER* 
Trade unionism and political organization are two different ways 
workers attempt to advance their economic and social objectives.  Unions 
are the institutional expression of workers’ self- (or third-party-aided) 
organization.  Unions fund themselves through membership dues or other 
sources and their achievements historically have been measured in the 
negotiation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.  Some 
political negotiation (either political parties or nongovernmental 
organizations), also claim to represent the interests of worker-members (or 
persons aligned with their members).  Both political parties and 
nongovernmental organizations are funded by membership dues and other 
sources; and their achievements are measured in legislation, regulations, 
and their enforcement.  Unlike Europe, the United States has no enduring 
labor party tradition,1 and the U.S. labor movement has historically 
separated its role as collective bargaining agency from its “political action” 
contributions to candidates for government office. 
Over the last several decades, trade unions in the United States 
increasingly have been unable to realize their objectives at the bargaining 
table and have turned more and more to politics.  The turn to the political 
has been true of labor movements in many European and developing 
countries for quite some time.  Because of the great decline in U.S. 
manufacturing, and the much-weakened position of trade unions in the 
 
* Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law; Faculty Director, Center for Labor and Employment 
Law, New York University School of Law.  An early version of this paper was presented as 
“Employee Representation that Makes Sense in Today’s World,” keynote address at the 
Conference on Competition in the Global Workplace: The Role of Law in Economic Markets, St. 
Louis University School of Law, April 3, 2009.  I thank Michael Levine, Kevin Kinney, Burt 
Neuborne, and the NYU Law faculty workshop for helpful comments; any remaining errors are 
my own.  Contact: Samuel.Estreicher@nyu.edu.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  Copyright © 2010 
by Samuel Estreicher. 
 1. See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN’T HAPPEN HERE:  
WHY SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
416 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:415 
private sector—due in significant part to globalization2—U.S. 
exceptionalism in this regard may be going by the boards as well. 
I. 
Trade unionism in private companies is a declining phenomenon in 
nearly all developed countries.  In the United States, for example, union 
contracts cover a little less than eight percent of workers in the private sector 
and over half of the members of the two leading union federations (the 
AFL-CIO and Change to Win) are workers in government offices even 
though public-sector employment is only one-sixth of the overall workforce.3  
The rate of decline may be slower in other developed countries, but the story 
of private-sector unionism decline is nearly universal, at least if viewed in 
terms of membership as opposed to contract coverage (where because of 
multiemployer bargaining structures and extension laws, contract coverage 
in some European countries far outstrips union membership).4  What started 
as a movement of workers against private capital is, in a sense, now a 
 
 2. My first sustained effort at exploring this issue is Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform 
in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1993) (Kenneth M. Piper 
Lecture in Labor Law at IIT’s Chicago-Kent School of Law). 
 3. See tbls.1 & 4, infra Part II.  In  2009, union members accounted for 12.3% of employed 
wage and salary workers, a slight decline from the previous year; in 1983, the first year for which 
comparable data are available, the union membership rate was 20.1%.  (Because of the effect of 
union security clauses, the percentage of employees covered by union contracts is usually a 
percentage point higher than the membership rate.)  Workers in government offices had a union 
membership rate (37.4%) over five times that of private sector employees (7.2%), and account for 
half of total union membership even though government work is a little more than one-fifth the 
size of the private workforce.  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU LAB. STATS., NEWS USDL-
10-0069, TABLE 3: UNION AFFILIATION OF EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY 
OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm.  
The data in this government release refers to “members of a labor union or an employee 
association similar to a union,” and presumably includes the three-million-member National 
Education Association which is not affiliated, though often politically aligned, with the AFL-CIO 
and Change to Win.  Id.  The split within the U.S. labor movement (which may soon be repaired) 
is evaluated in Samuel Estreicher, Disunity Within the House of Labor: Change to Win or to Stay 
the Course?, 27 J. LAB. RES. 505, 506 (2006); see also Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act 
Local”:  Employee Representation in a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 
4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 82 (2009). 
 4. See Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, MONTHLY  LAB. REV., 
Jan. 2006, at 38. See also Barry T. Hirsch, Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions 
and Industrial Competition Coexist?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2008, at 153; David G. 
Blanchflower, A Cross-Country Study  of Union Membership, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LAB., No. 
2016 (March 2006). 
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movement of government workers, government contractor employees, and 
aid recipients against public capital.5 
Unions also are decreasingly able to influence the terms and conditions 
of private employment by negotiating labor contracts.  More and more, 
unions turn to the state to legislate (and guarantee) wages, hours, and 
benefits.  What started as an expression of the self-organization of working 
people seeking what U.S. labor law terms “true freedom of contract” now 
takes the form of organized participation in the pluralist group bargaining 
process that is our political democracy.  The fabled “voluntarism” of 
Samuel Gompers, the founding president of the American Federation of 
Law (AFL), the first successful union federation in this country—that 
workers have to improve their lot by their own struggle, secure those gains 
through their own efforts and not depend on the state—no longer expresses 
the view of any major labor organization or leader. 
The increasing importance of politics to labor, and vice versa, finds 
expression in the influence of labor unions in the Obama administration 
and in its drive to legislate a public right to healthcare coverage and 
subsidize certain industries.6  We see a similar phenomenon in other 
countries.  Recently, Germany enacted minimum wage laws in certain 
industries, replacing what had been a system based on the “normative” 
force of industry-wide collective bargaining agreements.7  Early in the 
Blair administration, the United Kingdom instituted minimum wage 
councils because collective bargaining agreements were not effectively 
setting minimum standards.8  Indeed, one could view much of the European 
Union project as an attempt to substitute public law for contract in many 
areas of economic life. 
Of course, the dedication of U.S. trade unions to private market 
solutions, even in the supposed halcyon days of the Gompers presidency of 
the AFL, was never absolute.9  Along with opposition to certain legislative 
 
 5. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Negotiating the People’s Capital, 25 J. LAB. RES. 189, 
191 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Health Care Can’t Wait, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/healthcare/ 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 7. See Friederike Gobbels, German Minimum-Wage Law Enacted, 2 Jones Day European 
Labor & Employment Law Update 3 (Issue 1, Aug. 2009) (discussing 
Mindestarbeitsbedingungersetz—MiARbG (Minimum Working Conditions Act), ver. of April 
22, 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt—Teil I—Seite 818, Federal Law Gazette—Part I—Side 818). 
 8. See David Metcalf, The British National Minimum Wage, 37 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 171 
(Dec. 2002). 
 9. Some have argued that the voluntarism of Gompers and the early AFL reflected not so 
much deeply or sincerely held ideology but the brute reality of court hostility to maximum hours 
and other social legislation.  See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991). 
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solutions, such as social insurance, the Federation supported workers’ 
compensation laws and “prevailing wage” laws for government 
contractors.10  Moreover, with the onset of the Great Depression, which 
undermined faith in unregulated markets, both the AFL and the breakaway 
federation, the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), broadened their 
political aims, developed strong political action committees, and made 
significant contributions in cash and in kind, largely to Democratic 
candidates for the White House, Congress, and state houses.  Indeed, with 
the AFL-CIO merger in 1955, organized labor’s political influence 
expanded beyond purely labor relations concerns to include its critical 
backing of important social legislation such as the civil rights laws in the 
1960s.11 
Thus by the mid-1930s, organized labor rejected narrow conceptions of 
voluntarism, but the essential focus of U.S. trade unionism until the recent 
period was on securing and enforcing strong contracts in existing 
bargaining units, with some limited organizing of new units.  Politics was 
an adjunct, a supplement to trade unionism.  We are now, however, 
beginning to see a qualitative change in labor’s relationship to the state: 
trade unionism as a supplement to politics.  Labor’s economic objectives 
have not changed; the means are undergoing substantial transformation. 
The thesis of this paper is that largely in response to the deepening of 
competitive forces in private markets in the United States—deregulation, 
changing technology, and the opening up of global labor and product 
markets (due to decreasing transportation and communication costs and the 
lowering of trade barriers)—organized labor increasingly will function 
predominantly as a political organization.  Collective bargaining will 
continue to provide an institutional raison d’être and critical funding source 
for unions, but only one (and a diminishing one) of several means for 
advancing the interests of its members and other constituencies.  This is not 
to suggest the emergence of a labor party on the European model; it is an 
American variant: the fortunes of the labor movement will become ever 
more tightly tied to the fortunes of the Democratic Party, and economic 
goals increasingly will be achieved not at the bargaining table, but through 
the provision of public resources. 
 
 10. See Theron Schlabach, Rationality & Welfare: Public Discussion of Poverty and Social 
Insurance in the United States 1875–1935, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE: RESEARCH NOTES & 
SPECIAL STUDIES BY THE HISTORIAN’S OFFICE, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/ 
schlabach6.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  For accounts of the passage of the Davis-Bacon Act 
of 1931 and other prevailing-wage legislation, see ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., PREVAILING WAGE 
LEGISLATION (1986) and ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., THE DAVIS-BACON ACT (1975).  See also 
HERBERT R. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1946). 
 11. See generally John T. Delaney et al., Evolutionary Politics? Union Differences and 
Political Activities in the 1990s, 20 J. LAB. RES. 277, 278–79 (1999). 
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II. 
The turn to politics is not necessarily a good or bad development; it is 
understandable, if not unavoidable, given the challenges that unions face in 
private firms. 
The unions’ problems are not in the public sector.  In 2008, 36.8% of 
government workers were union members, and 40.7% were covered by 
collective bargaining contracts.  In 2009, public-sector union members 
outnumbered public-sector members for the first time in history.12  The 
extent of unionization of government workes is a remarkable achievement 
since not all states or localities recognize collective bargaining rights for 
their employees.13  Unions continue to register gains in the government 
sector—most recently by convincing a number of state governors and 
legislatures to establish an agency to act as the employer in collective 
bargaining with home health care workers.14 
Labor’s problems are in the private sector.  Unions will continue to 
represent segments of the labor force where the costs of delay place a 
significant premium on avoiding labor stoppage (e.g., big-city commercial 
construction, airlines), where barriers to entry give incumbent firms some 
ability to absorb labor cost increases without losing patronage (e.g., 
construction, airlines, licensed engineers), or where regulation of 
acquisitions and new areas of service give unions special leverage to 
extract concessions (e.g., healthcare and communications).  But for 
manufacturing generally, and the vast majority of private-sector companies, 
the unions’ task both to organize the workforce and insulate the unionized 
firm from the ravages of product market competition seems daunting.  Most 
unions, voting with their feet in terms of how they invest organizing 
resources, have essentially concurred by investing those resources 
elsewhere. 
Determining how much globalization, as such, has contributed to union 
deterioration is difficult.15  U.S. consumers’ ability to purchase high-quality 
 
 12. In 2009, for the first time, unions had more members employed in government offices 
(7.9 million) than in private companies (7.4 million).  See tbl.4 infra; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
TABLE 3, supra note 3. 
 13. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS:  INFORMATION 
ON THE NUMBER OF WORKERS WITH AND WITHOUT BARGAINING RIGHTS 8–9 (2002) (noting 
that twelve states lacked any collective bargaining laws for state and local employees). 
 14. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 09-15, 33 Ill. Reg. 10087 (June 29, 2009) (directing the State 
of Illinois to establish an agency to bargain with home health care workers). 
 15. The existing empirical literature on union density and globalization does not clearly 
indicate a strong, unequivocal relationship.  See, e.g., DAVID G. BLANCHFLOWER & ALEX 
BRYSON, THE UNION WAGE PREMIUM IN THE US AND THE UK 19 (Centre for Economic 
Performance, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., 2004), available at http:www.dartmouth.edu/ 
~blnchflr/papers/irralong.pdf; Dale Belman & Paula B. Voos, Changes in Union Wage Effects by 
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goods made abroad at lower prices than charged for U.S.-made goods, and 
U.S. companies’ ability to manufacture goods in places like China for sale 
back to the United States, has contributed to a shrinking of the 
manufacturing sector. 
A substantial literature has developed to attempt to explain the decline 
of unionism in private companies.16  My own view is that unions have 
trouble in competitive markets because, at least from the firm’s point of 
view, they are net cost-adding institutions17 but are unable to neutralize 
 
Industry: A Fresh Look at the Evidence, 43 INDUS. REL. 491, 518 (2004); Barry T. Hirsch et al., 
Estimates of Union Density by State, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 2001, at 54; Elisabetta Magnani 
& David Prentice, Did Globalization Reduce Unionization? Evidence from US Manufacturing, 10 
LAB. ECON. 705, 721 (2003); Matthew J. Slaughter, Globalization and Declining Unionization in 
the United States, 46 INDUS. REL. 329, 345 (2007). 
 16. Four major explanations have been offered: (1) Employer Opposition, see JOHN 
SCHMITT & BEN ZIPPERER, DROPPING THE AX: ILLEGAL FIRINGS DURING UNION ELECTION 
CAMPAIGNS, 1951–2007, at 1 (Center for Econ. & Pol’y Research 2009), available at 
http://www.wapt.com/download/2007/0105/10678436.pdf; PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE 
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 108–11 (1990); Paul Weiler, 
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1769, 1769–70 (1983); (2) Changes in Worker Attitudes, see Henry S. Farber & Alan B. 
Krueger, Union Membership in the United States: The Decline Continues, in EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 105, 130 (Bruce E. Kaufman & 
Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993); Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Workers’ Attitudes: 
Individualism as a Cause for Labor’s Decline, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE 
EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:  
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 50TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 41–116 
(Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998); RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 
69 (1999); but see SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN UNIONISM: 
WHY AMERICANS LIKE UNIONS MORE THAN CANADIANS DO, BUT JOIN MUCH LESS 94–95 
(2004); Leo Troy, Is the U.S. Unique in the Decline of Private Sector Unionism?, 11 J. LAB. RES. 
111, 137–38 (1990); (3) Structural Change, see Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Round Up the 
Usual Suspects: The Decline of Unions in the Private Sector, 1973–1998, at 2, 36 (Princeton 
Univ. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 437, 2001); see also LEO TROY, THE NEW UNIONISM 
IN THE NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS IN THE REDISTRIBUTIVE STATE 1 (1994); but see 
Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private Sector and Public 
Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 70 (1988); and (4) Global Labor and 
Product Market Competition, see Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local,” supra note 3, at 81; 
Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 581, 583 (2007); Estreicher, Labor Law Reform, supra note 2, at 10. 
 17. To employers in partially-organized industries, unions are perceived as net cost-adding 
institutions because unions seek to impose wage and benefit levels, seniority structures and job 
rules that increase the firm’s net labor costs beyond where they would have been in the absence of 
unionization—hence, the unions’ need, posited here, to impose the same cost regime on all 
competitors of the unionized firm.  Unions have also been fairly consistently found to detract 
from firm profits.  See BARRY T. HIRSCH, LABOR UNIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF 
FIRMS 87–88 (1991); Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do?: The 2004 M-Brane 
Stringtwister Edition (Natl. Bur. Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11410, 2005).  This is not say, 
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those costs by organizing the entire product market or by tariffs or 
“prevailing wage” laws dampening product market competition.18  This 
ultimately fuels both employer opposition and withdrawal of capital from 
the union sector which, in turn, helps explain why there is so little natural 
growth of union membership or organization in private firms.19 
The basic story set forth below in Table 1 is one of tremendous job 
growth in the private sector (at least until very recently), from 61.8 million 
jobs in 1973, nearly doubling to 108 million jobs in 2008 (down 5 million 
in 2009), with the total number of union members actually declining by 
around six million members during the same period: 







1973 61,886.5 14,954.1 N.A. 24.2 
1980 71,440.7 14,331.6 15,525.7 20.1 
1990 86,122.5 10,254.8 11,366.4 11.9 
1995 91,680.5 9432.1 10,359.8 10.3 
2000 101,809.9 9147.7 9968,5 9.0 
2005 105,508.46 8225 8961.6 7.8 
2008 108,072.6 8625.2 9084.4 7.6 
2009 103,357.3 7430.8 8226.1 7.2 
Table 1. Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment Among Private 
Sector Workers, 1973–2009 (in thousands)20 
If we look at the fortunes, over the same period, of a historically union 
density-rich sector like manufacturing, which has been substantially 
affected by globalization, the picture is somewhat different because 
manufacturing employment has declined (whereas overall private sector 
employment has grown substantially).  As Table 2 indicates, private 
manufacturing lost around 6.5 million jobs, while unions lost nearly the 
same number of members during this period. 
 
however, that unions necessarily impose net social costs—an inquiry beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 18. For my most recent article along these lines, see Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act 
Local,” supra note 3. 
 19. Barry Hirsch suggests that focusing on the overall decline in private sector 
manufacturing ignores the actual growth in nonunion manufacturing employment (an additional 
1.5 million jobs) between 1973 and 2006, despite a 2.5 million decline after 2000.  See Hirsh, 
Sluggish Institutions, supra note 4, at 156.  For a positive account of the state of U.S. 
manufacturing, see DANIEL IKENSON, THRIVING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
U.S. MANUFACTURING AND TRADE (Cato Institute, No. 35, Aug. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8750. 
 20. Data in the tables in this paper are adapted from Barry Hirsch & David McPherson’s 
website, Union Stats and Coverage Database, www.unionstats.com (last visited April 6, 2010). 
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% Members % Covered 
1973 20,107.6 7827.7 N.A. 38.9 N.A. 
1980 20,850.4 6726 7251.9 32.3 22.2 
1990 20,338.6 4197.3 4514.1 20.6 22.2 
1995 19,520 3439.6 3657.3 17.6 18.7 
2000 19167.3 2831.8 2999.4 14.8 15.6 
2005 15,518.4 2016.9 2127.3 13.0 13.7 
2008 15,131.4 1723.5 1862.5 11.4 12.3 
2009 13,454 1469.5 1594.7 10.9 11.9 
Table 2. Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment Among Private 
Sector Manufacturing Workers, 1973–2009 (in thousands) 
Table 3 combines reports to indicate the extent to which manufacturing 
workers during this period changed from being a central force in the trade 
union movement to account for just slightly more than one-fifth of total 
union membership. 








% of Total 
Membership 
1973 61,886.5 14,954.1 20,107.6 7827.7 .523 
1980 71,440.7 14,331.6 20,850.4 6726.0 .469 
1990 86,122 10,254.8 20,338.6 4197.3 .409 
1995 91,680.5 9432.1 19,520 3439.6 .364 
2000 101,809.9 9147.7 19,167.3 2831.8 .309 
2005 105,508.46 8225.0 15,518.4 2016.9 .245 
2008 108,072.6 8265.2 15,131.4 1723.5 .208 
2009 103,357.3 7430.8 13,454 1469.5 .19 
Table 3. Overall Private Sector Union Membership Compared to Union 
Membership in Private Manufacturing, 1973–2009 (in thousands) 
Table 4 offers a glimpse at the relevant importance of private and 
public sector membership to the overall trade union movement: from a ratio 
of one public sector member for every five private sector members in 1973 
to near parity in 2008 and numerical predominance in 2009, despite the fact 
that public employment is only 20% of the overall labor market. 
Year Total Private 
Employment 
Members Total Public 
Employment 
Members Public/Private 
1973 61,886.5 14,954.1 13,134.5 3134.5 .209 
1980 71,440.7 14,331.6 16,308.8 5763.6 .400 
1990 86,122.5 10,254.8 17,782.3 6485 .632 
1995 91,680.5 9432.1 18,357.6 6927.4 .734 
2000 101,809.9 9147.7 18,975.7 7110.5 .777 
2005 105,508.46 8225 20,380.9 7430.4 .903 
2008 108,072.6 8265.2 21,304.6 7832.3 .947 
2009 103,357.3 7430.8 21,132 7896.5 1.06 
Table 4. Overall Private Sector Union Membership Compared to Public Sector 
Membership, 1973–2009 (in thousands) 
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 Unions have taken numerous steps to attempt to reverse their fortunes 
in the private sector, through coalitions with nonlabor groups as well as 
other unions.  First, they have fashioned a strategy called the “corporate 
campaign” as an adjunct to traditional organizing.  Unions here identify 
vulnerabilities in target corporations—whether a need for shareholder 
approval of executive compensation, antitakeover devices, or a “going 
private” decision; a need for government approval to build a new wing of a 
hospital or enter into a new line of service; the scrutiny of regulators over 
some product mishap; or concerns involving wages or hours worked, 
antitrust, or other difficulties warranting systemic litigation.21  Unions then 
organize a campaign of adverse publicity and religious and community 
boycotts directed at the target and its executives.  The objective is to wrest 
from the target a “neutrality” and “card-check” agreement that facilitates 
union organization in some of the target’s facilities.  The union’s leverage 
sometimes also comes from pension fund managers and other allies in the 
institutional shareholder community that organized labor has cultivated 
over the last two decades.22 
Second, unions have made important strides in forging alliances with 
critical constituencies within the Democratic Party, both through their 
monetary and in-kind contributions to candidates23 and their support of key 
 
 21. For approving accounts, see James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check 
Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005); Adrienne E. 
Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality Card Check Agreements, 55 Indus. & 
Lab. Rel. Rev. 42 (2001).  For a critical view, see JAROL B. MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A 
THOUSAND CUTS: CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS AND THE ATTACK ON THE CORPORATION 39 (2000). 
 22. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:  
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING 
WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 50TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 341–47 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 
1998). 
 23. Eight labor organizations figured among the top 20 political action committees (in terms 
of total expenditures in 2009–10 election cycle); the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) came in second at $18,335,969, and the American Federation of State, County & 
Municipal Employee (AFSCME) came in fifth at $9,514,653.  See OpenSecrets.org, Political 
Action Committees, http://opensecrets.org/pacs/ (last visited April 6, 2010).  Eleven labor 
organizations are listed among the top thirty “All-Time Donors” for 1989–2010; AFSCME came 
in second with a $40,965,173 total, 98% of which went to Democratic candidates; the National 
Education Association, not an affiliate of either labor federation, came in seventh at $29,908,625, 
92% of which went to Democratic candidates.  OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics, 
Heavy Hitters: Top All-Time Donors 1989–2010 Summary, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/ 
list.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  Among top so-called “527” committees, SEIU came in first 
with $27,839,177 in expenditures.  OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics, 527S 
Committees: Top 50 Federally Focused Organizations: 2008, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/ 
527cmtes.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  The SEIU also engaged in an extensive 
“microtargeting” effort during the 2008 campaign. CATALIST, AGGREGATE ACTIVITIES OF 
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causes pressed by those constituencies, including universal healthcare and 
legalization of undocumented aliens.  The objective is to promote a 
widespread understanding among Democratic politicians and activists that 
broad-gauged labor law reform to facilitate union organization is essential.  
We see this, of course, in the current campaign for the Employee Free 
Choice Act (EFCA) and the vocal support of most of the media and activist 
NGOs like Human Rights Watch and moveon.org. 
Third, unions have also forged ties with state and local legislators 
(some of whom may be especially indebted to public employee 
organizations) and community groups to promote enactment of “living 
wage” ordinances that, like “prevailing wage” laws in government-financed 
construction, arguably help mitigate some of the cost disadvantages of 
union representation.24  Similarly, with limited success, they have urged 
that relaxation of trade barriers be accompanied by enforceable labor 
standards, as exemplified by the recent decision of the Obama 
administration to impose sanctions on Chinese tire imports.25 
This is a partial list but sufficient for present purposes to illustrate the 
kinds of efforts unions and their allies are engaged in to gain a stronger 
position in the U.S. private sector. 
III. 
Are these union efforts to retake the commanding heights of the private 
sector likely to succeed?  It is too early, of course, to tell definitively.  
Conceivably, within a year or two, an Obama administration success on 
healthcare reform may engender sufficient public support for Democratic 
objectives to embolden U.S. Senators put in office with the help of labor 
dollars and sweat to vote for an unadulterated version of the EFCA, thus 
 
PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN 2008: COMPILATION OF DATA FROM CATALIST SUBSCRIBERS 
36–37 (2009); Posting of Marc Ambinder to The Atlantic Politics Channel, http://politics.the 
atlantic.com/2009/10/seius_data_footprint_in_2008.php (Oct. 6, 2009, 08:54 EST). 
 24. See Zachary D. Fasman, Living Wage Ordinances and Traditional Labor Law: An 
Uneasy Conjunction, in COMPENSATION, WORK HOURS AND BENEFITS: PROCEEDING OF NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY THE 57TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 110 (Jeffrey Hirsch ed., 2009); 
see also Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government Law for Low-
Wage Workers 1, 3–4 (The Univ. of Chicago Legal Forum Research Paper No. 09-23, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1472039. 
 25. See U.S. Office of the Trade Representative, Information Regarding Application of 
Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Measure to Chinese Tires, Sept. 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/node/5068.  For a discussion of “buy American” provisions in recent 
economic crisis recovery legislation, see Angelo A. Paparelli & Ted J. Chiappari, Employ 
America Workers Act: Protectionist Turducken, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 23, 2009, at 3; Laura M. 
Baughtman & Joseph F. Francois, Chamber of Comm., Trade Action—or Inaction: The Cost for 
American Workers and Companies, Sept. 15, 2009. 
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smoothing the path for union organizers.  But there is reason to believe that 
even after passage of a law like EFCA labor’s problems in the private 
sector will essentially continue, and that labor’s turn to the political may 
produce less fruit than hoped. 
The experience of Canadian unions in their private sector suggests that 
even with enactment of EFCA and other laws on labor’s wish list, such as 
protections against strikebreakers, organizing rights for low-level 
supervisors, and mandatory bargaining over some permissive subjects, 
labor’s fortunes in private firms are not likely to be reversed any time soon.  
Strong pro-union laws can slow down deunionization, but the Canadian 
experience provides little basis for hope that it will lead to significant 
increased membership or labor contract coverage.26 
This is because, if I may be allowed to lapse into old materialist ways 
of thinking, law can only do so much to curb material forces.  A law like 
EFCA does not change the basic underlying economic dynamic.  If 
unionization represents significant net labor costs (taking into account the 
quality and productivity of unionized labor) and unions cannot impose the 
same costs on the competition, legal employer opposition will continue 
unabated.  Legal employer opposition may come earlier in the game under 
EFCA; employers of any significant size are likely to engage in a 
continuous anti-union educational campaign among their workforce.  Many 
employees, once informed that unions cannot, in fact, deliver job security, 
will hesitate to sign union authorization cards, even under a card-check 
regime.  Moreover, even if a unionization drive at a particular facility 
succeeds, this will be like being hit by lightning; because under EFCA, as 
proposed, an arbitrator will decide contract terms which, if the experience 
of the U.S. public sector is instructive, will have little relation to actual 
economic constraints on the organized firm.  Companies are likely to do 
whatever they lawfully can to escape this fate.  There is, moreover, no 
guarantee against “capital flight,” as well as no guarantee that the company 
will make needed capital investments in the unionized sector of its business 
rather than invest in other parts of the country or other countries where 
labor costs are considerably lower. 
Concern about such a dynamic change helps explain why labor has 
strongly supported passage of single-payer universal healthcare, and is a 
 
 26. In 2004, the unionization rate in the Canadian “commercial sector” (which excludes 
public services but includes quasi-governmental Crown corporations and the publicly financed 
healthcare industry) hovered around 20%—a 10% drop from 1981.  See Rene Morissette, et al., 
Diverging Trends in Unionization, PERSPECTIVES 5, Apr. 2005.  In 2007, the unionization rate for 
private sector workers declined to 17%; for the first half of 2008, it dropped to 16.3%.  See 
Perspectives on Labour and Income: Unionization, PERSPECTIVES 31, Aug. 2009.  The figures 
for employees covered by collective agreement are a percentage point higher. 
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leading proponent of Obama administration healthcare reform legislation.  
This campaign is also a reflection in part of labor’s diminishing bargaining 
power in private firms.  Labor rightly fears that firms will seek to cut 
healthcare benefits even in the union sector, and that union resistance is 
likely to be costly, if not futile.  By establishing a public entitlement to 
substantial healthcare benefits, this item is removed from the bargaining 
table, and, labor can try to negotiate for their member enhancements to the 
publicly funded package. 
The turn to the political campaign, while promising in some ways, may 
not deliver on the hoped-for contribution to organizing the private sector.  
Labor may find that its considerable contribution to enactment of 
healthcare reform also helps, paradoxically, diminish interest on the part of 
the unorganized in seeking union representation.  Why pay for something 
you are getting for free?27  It is going to be difficult to encourage 
employers to add on to what is already a hefty government mandate.  
Moreover, the need to find funding sources for comprehensive healthcare 
legislation has led Congress to cut back on the exclusion of employer-paid 
healthcare benefits from the taxable income of recipients, likely in many 
cases to be union members.  Although labor opposition to taxation of so-
called “Cadillac healthcare” plans led to a deferred effective date for the 
tax, the irony remains: To pay for a healthcare benefit that will be available 
to all, regardless of union affiliation, labor’s allies in Congress may cut the 
legs out from under a principal selling point for union organizers: union-
negotiated healthcare benefits.28 
Familiar to students of U.S. labor history, such a dynamic was one of 
the reasons Gompers and the old AFL resisted social legislation and urged 
labor to negotiate its way—through its own economic muscle, scope of 
organization and appreciation of the economic constraints on organized 
employers—to a better life for its members. 
 
 
 27. For a discussion of the general “free rider” problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971). 
 28. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Parked Cadillac: Don’t Blame Labor for Whittling Down the 
Tax on High-End Health Insurance, SLATE, Jan. 15, 2010, www.slate.com/id/2241750. 
